7. Options for reform

7.1​As suggested throughout this paper, the law on legal privilege has not adapted to meet the needs of modern legal service delivery methods for people experiencing disadvantage.

7.2​People facing disadvantage are often not aware of the legal aspects of their problems, and do not always seek legal assistance.^[152] Embedding a lawyer in a hospital (for example) creates an entry point to legal assistance that a patient would not otherwise have. Even if a person does seek legal assistance, they are not always able to give informed and ongoing instructions to their lawyer, without additional support.

7.3​This creates a systemic catch-22. Without integrated legal assistance services, people experiencing disadvantage cannot take up the legal remedies available to them. Yet with integrated legal assistance services, people experiencing disadvantage are currently forced to jeopardise their fundamental right to legal privilege, undermining the effectiveness of the legal remedies now available.

7.4​In this chapter, we put forward two potential options for reform that would provide greater protection for confidential communications between clients experiencing disadvantage and professionals providing integrated legal assistance services. In doing so, each could potentially enhance access to justice.

7.5​The first option for reform is the creation of a professional privilege that would apply to social service professionals providing loosely integrated legal assistance services alongside—but apart from—lawyers. The potential privilege would operate side-by-side with legal privilege.

7.6​The second option for reform is the creation of a new category of legal privilege that would cover communications with lawyers and social service professionals jointly providing closely integrated legal assistance services to people experiencing disadvantage.

7.7​This chapter explores the possible scope, elements, eligibility requirements and implications of these reform options, with a view to seeking feedback on the issues that arise in relation to their operation and impact.

Option 1: A social service professional privilege

7.8​In loosely integrated legal assistance service settings, legal privilege is not at risk so long as the information barriers between legal and social services are maintained. A social service professional privilege could therefore sit alongside legal privilege (as it now operates), giving additional protection to confidential communications between clients and social service professionals in those settings.

Scope of the social service professional privilege

7.9​This section considers whether a potential social service professional privilege should apply to investigative bodies as well as court proceedings, and whether it should be qualified.

Should the privilege apply to investigative bodies?

7.10​If a legislatively enshrined social service professional privilege were introduced, consideration would need to be given to whether including it in the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) (Evidence Act) would be sufficient. Confining the privilege to court proceedings in this way would be consistent with all other non-legal professional privileges in Australia.^[153]

Should the privilege be qualified?

7.11​Professional privileges can be absolute, in which case they must be upheld if the requirements for the privilege are met, unless one of the few public interest exceptions apply (see paragraphs 2.28-2.29 for the circumstances in which legal privilege can be overridden). Or they can be qualified, in which case they may be upheld once a court has balanced competing interests identified in legislation.

7.12​Creating a qualified privilege would be consistent with all other non-legal professional privileges in Victoria, including journalist privilege and sexual assault communications privilege.^[154] It is also consistent with professional confidential relationship privilege elsewhere.^[155]

7.13​As qualified privileges are vulnerable to being overridden by judicial discretion, the protection they provide is inherently uncertain. Claiming the privilege is also resource intensive, as it is harder to uphold without a judicial determination.

7.14​Recently, the release of counselling records of survivors of sexual assault by services such as 1800RESPECT has led to calls from the community for the sexual assault communications privilege to be upgraded to an absolute privilege. This is because ‘accessing counselling records can fundamentally undermine the work of mental health services … [and] discourage victims from seeking help when they need it the most’.^[156]

7.15​Other than legal privilege, the only professional privileges in Australia that are absolute are medical communications privilege in the Northern Territory and Tasmania, and sexual assault communications privilege, also in Tasmania.^[157] In these circumstances, the government has seemingly decided that the public benefit of ensuring people who need these services can access them without fear of exposure is greater than the public benefit of information being available in associated court proceedings.

Elements of the social service professional privilege

7.16​The potential privilege would attach to confidential communications between a client and social service professional providing integrated legal assistance services. This section asks how ‘confidential’, ‘communications’ and ‘integrated legal assistance services’ should be defined.

What should confidential mean?

7.17​It is often necessary for social service professionals to use a client’s confidential information, with consent, to advocate on their behalf to other organisations. For example, a financial counsellor may share a client’s circumstances of family violence with a debt collection agency to prevent inappropriate debt recovery practices. It could be considered necessary for a social service professional privilege to protect such disclosures as the use of information in this way is key to the delivery of integrated legal assistance services.

7.18​In addition, social service professionals can currently share client information with lawyers, but lawyers cannot share client information with social service professionals for fear of compromising legal privilege. Without a broad definition of confidential, the potential social service professional privilege may reduce how much information social service professionals can share with lawyers in integrated legal assistance service settings.

Which communications should be protected?

7.19​Given the diversity of social services provided alongside legal services in integrated settings, protecting all confidential communications between clients and social service professionals in these settings would provide the most certainty. Although this covers communications made about a range of topics and for a range of purposes, the breadth of protection afforded by non-legal professional privileges is balanced by the broad circumstances in which they can be overridden.^[158]

What should integrated legal assistance services mean?

7.20​National funding agreements for legal assistance services are confined to free legal services funded by government—those being, legal aid and community legal services.^[159] However, pro bono services provided by private lawyers also play an important role in enhancing access to justice for people experiencing disadvantage. For this reason, we have included pro bono services in the definition of legal assistance services in this report.

7.21​For the purposes of enshrining a social service professional privilege in legislation, any definition of legal assistance services should include services provided by Victoria Legal Aid and community legal centres. It is less clear whether the definition should include services provided by pro bono practices in commercial law firms in their own right (that is, as distinct from when they partner with Victoria Legal Aid or a community legal centre). A definition of legal assistance services that included pro bono lawyers could potentially create integrity risks, as clients could attempt to use the privilege for commercial gain rather than to support access to justice.^[160]

7.22​The range of social service providers that work alongside lawyers providing integrated legal assistance services is extensive and difficult to list exhaustively. A useful starting point may be the professional confidential relationship privilege, which requires that the confidant is acting in a professional capacity and is under an express or implied obligation not to disclose the contents of a communication.^[161]

Eligibility for the social service professional privilege

7.23​Service providers rely on professional privileges until a court (or investigative body, in the case of legal privilege) compels the production of certain communications, and the client or service provider objects on account of privilege. The court then determines if the privilege applies. A social service professional privilege could operate in the same way.

Implications of the social service professional privilege

7.24​This section considers the benefits and disadvantages of a qualified privilege, including in relation to the existing disclosure obligations of social service professionals discussed in Chapter 4.

Limited protection for client information

7.25​Historically, qualified privileges have been overturned by courts or under-used by eligible parties because they are poorly understood.^[162] As shown in Case Study 4 on pages 31-32, the qualified privilege was not upheld in relation to the client’s counselling records, whereas the absolute privilege was upheld in relation to the client’s legal records.

7.26​If the potential privilege were qualified, clients may not feel assured that their private information is adequately protected from disclosure. However, social service professionals and service providers may welcome the flexibility this provides when it comes to adhering with existing information disclosure requirements, especially when it comes to revealing potential harm to children.

Impact on obligations to disclose information

7.27​A qualified social service professional privilege would not impact the mandatory disclosure obligations of some social service professionals, although it could potentially override discretionary ethical obligations, such as a duty to report safety risks.

Option 2: A new category of legal privilege incorporating social service professionals

7.28​A new category of legal privilege could attach to confidential communications made between a client, lawyer and social service professional for the purpose of accessing integrated legal assistance services.

7.29​At common law, legal privilege can only be expanded to incorporate novel circumstances if doing so would further, rather than impede, the administration of justice.^[163] Where the delivery of social services is critical to the safe and accessible provision of legal services in integrated legal assistance service settings, the new legal privilege appears to meet this criterion.

7.30​When extending legal privilege to third parties supporting the provision of legal advice in Pratt Holdings v Commissioner of Taxation, Justice Finn observed that denying legal privilege to an ‘under-resourced client’ who must rely on third parties to obtain effective legal advice (because they do not have the knowledge or expertise themselves) would ‘undercut the privilege itself’.^[164]

Scope of the new legal privilege

7.31​This section considers whether the potential privilege should apply to court proceedings and investigative bodies, and whether it should be absolute.

Should the privilege protect clients before courts and investigative bodies?

7.32​As discussed in Chapter 2, the common law mostly protects client information from disclosure to government investigative bodies, like child protection, whereas the Evidence Act mostly protects client information from disclosure to courts.

7.33​Allowing clients to access the new legal privilege in one context but not the other may be difficult to justify. It may also be unworkable because a service provider could not adopt practices that would be protected by the potential privilege in one arena, while simultaneously extinguishing the privilege in the other arena.

Should the privilege be absolute?

7.34​An absolute privilege would be consistent with the level of protection afforded under the current law on legal privilege. The justification for the absolute nature of legal privilege is its role in furthering the administration of justice, the fact that a lawyer’s duty to the court and the administration of justice is paramount, and the fact that lawyers who breach this duty are subject to harsh sanctions.^[165]

7.35​A qualified privilege for legal and social service professionals would reduce protection for clients accessing integrated legal assistance services and require clients to establish their claims for privilege more often in court.

Elements of the new legal privilege

7.36​This section considers the legal elements of the new privilege, including what integrated legal assistance services should mean, and whether the new privilege should include a safety exception.

Which communications should be protected?

7.37​Client legal privilege in the Evidence Act protects ‘communications’ with third parties for the purpose of litigation, but only ‘documents’ prepared by third parties for the purpose of legal advice. Given the nature of the services the potential privilege is aiming to protect, it may be desirable to protect all communications, including documents, as this would provide greater certainty for both clients and service providers.

What should confidential mean?

7.38​Information shared between a client, lawyer and social service professional is likely to be considered confidential as there is an expectation of confidentiality in integrated legal assistance service settings. However, confidentiality in the context of a new legal privilege may also need to allow for the sharing of information for a contained purpose.

7.39​As discussed at paragraph 7.17, it is often necessary for social service professionals to use a client’s confidential information to advocate on their behalf to other organisations. The potential privilege may need to protect such disclosures to adequately support the delivery of closely integrated legal assistance services.

What should the purpose of the communications be?

7.40​Any purpose test would need to be framed broadly to reflect the range of reasons clients use integrated legal assistance services. At a minimum, ‘obtaining legal services’ would need to be an ‘appreciable purpose’ of the communications^[166] or, alternatively, ‘obtaining integrated legal assistance services’ could be the ‘dominant purpose’ of the communications.

What should integrated legal assistance services mean?

7.41​Once again, it would seem reasonable to align the definition of legal assistance services with the existing national funding agreement for those services.^[167] Determining whether the definition should include pro bono services in their own right is more difficult, as is defining ‘integrated’.

7.42​A new legal privilege would need to address the heightened risk to legal privilege that currently arises in relation to closely integrated legal assistance services. This model may operate in a single organisation employing both legal and social service professionals, or through formal partnerships between separate organisations delivering services jointly, such as a health justice partnership. Presumably, clients of both program types should benefit from the protection of the privilege.

7.43​The range of social services that may be integrated with legal assistance services is broad. While services such as financial counselling would fall within scope, it is less clear whether adjacent professions—such as financial advisers—should be included. Any definition of integrated legal assistance services may need to distinguish between professional roles that sufficiently support access to justice, and those that do not.

7.44​A related issue concerns the clients who receive the services, and who would benefit from the protection of the privilege. The legal assistance sector is funded to provide services to groups of people that are marginalised and a priority for government. This paper has used the term ‘people experiencing disadvantage’ in keeping with the term first used in the national funding agreement.^[168] While specifically defining this term for the purpose of the privilege may also be difficult, such precision may not ultimately be necessary.

7.45​This is because the way in which the privilege is implemented would affect the scope of integrated legal assistance services it covers. For example, limiting the privilege to clients of Victoria Legal Aid and community legal centres would provide operational clarity and integrity, but may also exclude clients of pro bono lawyers unless they partnered with those bodies. It would also necessarily determine which clients the privilege would apply to. This is discussed further at paragraphs 7.52-7.56.

Should there be a safety exception?

7.46​If introduced, a new legal privilege would displace the reporting and information sharing obligations of social service professionals discussed in Chapter 4. While the privilege is intended to provide protection to people experiencing disadvantage, consideration must also be given to the safety of those the reporting and information sharing obligations are designed to protect, including children at risk of harm.

7.47​The rules that permit legal professionals to disclose confidential information where a there is a risk of personal harm have a significantly higher test than the reporting and information sharing obligations that currently apply to social service professionals.^[169] Applying the standard of legal professionals to all professionals providing integrated legal assistance services would reduce the ability of service providers to disclose information about a person at risk of harm.

7.48​An exception to the privilege could be introduced that allows, or possibly requires, professionals in possession of privileged information to share that information to prevent harm to the client or others. The critical question is what level and type of harm should be required to permit disclosure.

7.49​In Canada, the Model Code of Professional Conduct allows a solicitor to disclose privileged information where there is an imminent risk of serious bodily harm or death, which is still a considerably high threshold.^[170]

7.50​The High Court of Australia overrode legal privilege in R v Bell because of the higher public interest in ‘securing the welfare of a child’ in family law proceedings.^[171] This supports the general proposition of including a safety exception for children.

7.51​A 2021 review of the Solicitors’ Conduct Rules considered whether psychological or financial harm should be able to be disclosed by legal professionals, in addition to physical harm.^[172] Consideration should also be given to whether threats of self-harm, as opposed to threats of harm to others, should be included, noting self-harm is not illegal, whereas harm to others is.

Eligibility for the new legal privilege

7.52​Uncertainty surrounding the application of the law on legal privilege remains, despite significant work by the community legal sector to develop practice guidelines for integrated legal assistance services (see paragraphs 5.3-5.13). Providing greater certainty about when the new legal privilege could be relied upon could be a key benefit of the privilege.

7.53​Enshrining the privilege in legislation, while otherwise allowing it to operate in the same way as legal advice and litigation privilege under common law and legislation, may not provide the required certainty and integrity. Under the current law, it may take lengthy and costly litigation to determine whether a communication is privileged. Departing from one of the few fixed elements of the current law on privilege—that being the traditional context in which legal privilege most obviously applies—might exacerbate its contestable nature.

7.54​Creating a framework to determine, in advance, when the privilege would apply, may help provide certainty and clarity. Clients of legal assistance providers or programs that meet a set of predetermined criteria would then be able to rely on the privilege.

7.55​One option would be to establish an accreditation framework under which an organisation or program could be recognised as an integrated legal assistance service provider for the purpose of relying on the new legal privilege. This option would allow services to ‘opt-in’ to the framework and could be implemented through existing accreditation mechanisms for legal assistance services to limit costs.

7.56​Another option for determining which organisations or programs could rely on the privilege would be to establish a regulatory scheme that authorises a government minister to designate eligible organisations or programs. This could be done through an application process or built into funding agreements. While this option would also provide considerable certainty and integrity, it may also require significant administrative and financial resources.

Implications of the new legal privilege

7.57​Creating a new legal privilege for integrated legal assistance services in Victoria may create problems for clients whose legal matters cross multiple jurisdictions, place an additional financial burden on the strained resources of the legal assistance sector, and increase demands on professionals delivering those services.

7.58​Expanding legal privilege to incorporate social service professionals in integrated legal assistance service settings may also give rise to misplaced concerns about the potential application of legal privilege to integrated legal services in commercial contexts.

Inconsistency with other Australian jurisdictions

7.59​Australia’s Commonwealth, State and Territory governments sometimes adopt uniform laws to ensure national consistency. The Legal Profession Uniform Law discussed at paragraphs 2.44-2.46 is one such law;^[173] and the Uniform Evidence Law on which Victoria’s legislation is based, is another.^[174] 

7.60​Uniformity across Australia’s evidence laws aims to make it easy for lawyers to reliably and confidently apply evidentiary requirements across state and federal jurisdictions. Nonetheless, the evidence law of each Australian jurisdiction is somewhat different to the others.^[175]

7.61​As the privilege would be contained in Victorian legislation, it would apply to matters heard in Victorian courts. Integrated legal assistance service providers operating solely in this jurisdiction would be able to rely on it in their service delivery.

7.62​The privilege would not apply to matters in other states or territories. Victorian integrated legal assistance service providers operating across state borders would not be able to rely on the privilege for fear of inadvertently extinguishing their client’s privilege elsewhere. For example, an accused person charged with drug-related offences may access a legal assistance service provider in Albury-Wodonga that provides integrated legal and alcohol or other drug services. Where charges were laid in Victoria, the client would be able to rely on the new legal privilege to protect information they provided and received in a joint meeting with the legal and social service professionals. However, where charges were brought in New South Wales, that same information would not be protected because the privilege would not apply.

7.63​There is a question as to whether the new legal privilege would apply in federal courts sitting in Victoria, such as the Federal Circuit and Family Court. Section 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) allows for state laws relating to evidence and court procedures to be ‘picked up’ and applied in federal proceedings being heard in that state, where there is ‘a gap’ in federal laws.^[176]

7.64​The new legal privilege, which would form part of Victorian evidence law, may be the kind of law capable of being picked up by section 79. As we have highlighted, the law on legal privilege has not kept pace with the development of integrated legal assistance services. In this respect, it could be argued that the current construction of legal privilege contains a gap. If a federal court could be persuaded that federal evidence law has a similar gap, the privilege may be able to be relied on in federal court proceedings heard in Victoria, in the same way the privilege would apply to Victorian proceedings.

7.65​If this were accepted, clients accessing integrated legal assistance services would be able to rely on the privilege when accessing support for both state and federal law matters, such as family violence law (a state matter) and family law (a federal matter).

7.66​In federal courts not sitting in Victoria, the privilege would not apply and could not be picked up by section 79, as that section can only apply Victorian laws to federal proceedings heard in Victoria.

7.67​Adopting the privilege nationally would remove this inconsistency.

Potential financial burden on the legal assistance sector

7.68​If a new category of legal privilege were introduced, it would operate as an additional protection for those who access integrated legal assistance services. While some service providers may not want to fully integrate their services and make use of the privilege, additional administration and training costs may impose a financial burden on those who do. The new category of privilege may also give rise to litigation testing the circumstances in which the privilege applies. This would impose a further financial burden on clients and service providers.

Impact on professionals

7.69​If introduced, the new legal privilege would likely create a dual system of protections and obligations for lawyers and social service professionals providing legal assistance services. Many service providers deliver independent and integrated services for clients simultaneously. For example, a community legal centre may provide services to clients that are not integrated (in which case the current two categories of legal privilege would apply) while also providing a closely integrated health justice program (where the new legal privilege could also apply). Additional processes, case management systems and training may be required for professionals working in these services to manage the practicalities of dual protections and obligations.

7.70​In addition, social service professionals may feel uneasy about the extent to which the new legal privilege would override their professional disclosure obligations. A carefully designed safety exception may go some way to addressing this concern.

Exclusion of integrated legal services in commercial contexts

7.71​The courts’ position on the application of legal privilege to integrated legal services in commercial contexts is clear.

7.72​In the recent case of Commissioner of Taxation v PricewaterhouseCoopers, Justice Moshinsky recognised claims of privilege over some documents prepared by lawyers and non-lawyers in a large integrated legal services firm, while rejecting claims of privilege over others. The documents that attracted privilege were deemed to have been made for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice, whereas those that did not were deemed to have been made for some other commercial purpose.^[177]

7.73​In reaching this decision, Justice Moshinsky cited the following observation from Pratt Holdings:

Advice as to commercially advantageous ways to structure a transaction are extremely unlikely to attract privilege because the purpose in putting the advice together will, in most cases, be quite independent of the need for legal advice. Even if the parties have in mind that the advice will be submitted to a lawyer for comment, the purpose is unlikely to be the dominant purpose.^[178]

7.74​Similarly, in Mann v Carnell, Justice McHugh observed that ‘in commercial relationships, it is often convenient and useful for legal advice to be circulated among non-lawyers who are not officers or employees of the client which owns the privilege’.^[179] Privilege will not attach to this advice because ‘the client who does so is furthering his, her or its personal corporate interests, not the administration of justice’.^[180]

7.75​As suggested throughout this paper, the provision of free legal and social services for people experiencing disadvantage is necessary to ensure access to justice and is therefore consistent with the administration of justice. As such, expanding legal privilege to integrated legal assistance services is distinct from the above decisions limiting the application of privilege to third-party communications in commercial contexts. Consequently, expanding legal privilege to integrated legal assistance services would have few, if any, implications for the application of legal privilege in those contexts.

152. ​Nigel J Balmer et al, The Public Understanding of Law Survey (PULS) Volume 1: Everyday Problems and Legal Need (Report, Victoria Law Foundation, 2023) 99 <https://puls.victorialawfoundation.org.au/publications/everyday-problems-and-legal-need>.

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153. ​Gino Dal Pont, Law of Confidentiality (LexisNexis, 2nd ed, 2020) para 18.9.

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154. ​See Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 126K (journalist privilege); and Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic) s 32C (confidential communications privilege).

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155. ​See Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) ss 126A-126F; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) ss 126A-126F; Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) ss 126A-126F; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 20A-20F.

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156. ​Rachael Burgin and Gemma Hamilton, ‘Rapists’ Lawyers Are Using Their Victim-Survivors’ Counselling Notes in Court. This Needs to Stop’, The Conversation (online, 30 March 2026) <https://theconversation.com/rapists-lawyers-are-using-their-victim-survivors-counselling-notes-in-court-this-needs-to-stop-279314>.

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157. ​See Table 1: Australian Professional Privileges in Appendix A for more information.

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158. ​See, for example, Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic) s 32D balancing the ‘probative value’ and the ‘public interest in preserving the confidentiality’ and harm to a protected person, in relation to the sexual assault communications privilege in Victoria; or Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 126B balancing likely harm with the ‘desirability of the evidence being given’, in relation to the professional confidential relationship privilege in New South Wales.

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159. ​Commonwealth of Australia and the States and Territories, National Access to Justice Partnership Agreement 2025-30 (Report, November 2024) <https://federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/sites/federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/files/2025-09/agreement-national-access-to-justice-partnership-signed.pdf>.

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160. ​For more on the court’s position on the application of legal privilege in commercial multidisciplinary practice settings, see paragraphs 7.71-7.75.

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161. ​Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 126A(1).

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162. ​Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Criminal Justice Report: Parts VII-X and Appendices (Report, 2017) 258 <https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/file-list/final_report_-_criminal_justice_report_-_parts_vii_to_x_and_appendices.pdf>.

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163. ​R v Bell; Ex parte Lees [1980] HCA 26; (1980) 146 CLR 141, 151–52 [12] (Stephen J), see also 161 [7] (Wilson J).

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164. ​Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCAFC 122; (2004) 136 FCR 357, 368 [42]-[44].

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165. ​Ronald J Desiatnik, Legal Professional Privilege in Australia (LexisNexis Australia, 4th ed, 2025) 24.

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166. ​When just one of the purposes of a communication had to be legal for privilege to apply, it had to be an appreciable or substantial purpose: Esso Australia Resources v Commissioner of Taxation [1999] HCA 67; (1999) 201 CLR 49, 66 [39] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ).

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167. ​Commonwealth of Australia and the States and Territories, National Access to Justice Partnership Agreement 2025-30 (Report, November 2024) <https://federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/sites/federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/files/2025-09/agreement-national-access-to-justice-partnership-signed.pdf>.

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168. ​Council of Australian Governments, National Partnership Agreement on Legal Assistance Services (Report, 26 July 2017)
     
     <https://www.ag.gov.au/legal-system/publications/national-partnership-agreement-legal-assistance-services>.

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169. ​Legal Profession Uniform Conduct (Barristers) Rules 2015; Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules 2015.

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170. ​Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct (Report, April 2024) r 3.3-3.

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171. ​R v Bell; Ex parte Lees [1980] HCA 26; (1980) 146 CLR 141, 146 [8] (Gibbs J).

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172. ​Law Council of Australia, Review of the Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules (Report, 5 May 2021) 41–49, which found that ‘further consultations will be necessary [regarding] whether the Rule 9 exceptions should apply to psychological and financial harm’.

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173. ​Applied in NSW and Victoria, see Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2014 (Vic).

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174. ​See Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT).

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175. ​Attorney General’s Department, Uniform Evidence Acts Comparative Tables (Report, 27 August 2015) <https://www.ag.gov.au/legal-system/publications/uniform-evidence-acts-comparative-tables>.

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176. ​Rizeq v Western Australia [2017] HCA 23; (2017) 262 CLR 1.

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177. ​Commissioner of Taxation v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2022] FCA 278, [209]-[220].

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178. ​Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCAFC 122; (2004) 136 FCR 357, 387 [107] (Stone J, with Merkel J agreeing); cited in Commissioner of Taxation v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2022] FCA 278, [166].

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179. ​Mann v Carnell [1999] HCA 66; (1999) 201 CLR 1, 38 [121].

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180. ​Ibid.

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