Improving the Justice System Response to Sexual Offences: Report (html)

4. Rebuilding the system for responding to sexual violence

Overview

• The ‘system’ for responding to sexual violence is under strain. The first, and most urgent, step in improving the system’s response is to invest in the services that respond to sexual violence.

• The next step should be to rebuild the system. While each part has made genuine progress, they need to be connected more closely.

• The right structure need to be set up so that everyone in the system who responds to sexual violence has a shared understanding of what it is and how best to respond to it.

• This structure should include a senior statewide group representing those within and outside government to lead the system and regional groups. The structure should include at its heart those who have experienced sexual violence.

• This structure should include a working group of regulators.

• The ways these structures are to work together should be embedded through a model multi-agency protocol.

• We recommend strengthening the Victims’ Charter Act 2006 (Vic) to extend rights for people who have experienced sexual violence. This will increase the oversight powers of the Victims of Crime Commissioner.

The response to sexual violence needs rebuilding

4.1 In this inquiry, we have been impressed by the commitment, care and effort of many people and organisations who work to respond to sexual violence. We have been encouraged to hear of the progress since we last reported on sexual offences in 2004.

4.2 There have been clear improvements in the way people work together to respond to sexual violence, especially in multi-disciplinary centres (MDCs). MDCs bring together specialist sexual assault services, police and child protection. The Child Witness Service (see Chapter 12) and intermediaries (see Chapter 15) are significant steps forward.

4.3 But we have seen that those people and organisations responding to sexual violence are not supported by an effective overarching structure. They are not connected closely enough to achieve shared goals. They share a commitment, but their individual goals and measures often differ.

4.4 There is no high-level forum where organisations meet regularly to identify needs, develop strategies, measure progress and resolve disputes. Feedback from one part of the system does not flow through to others. While there are examples of good practice in many places, there are significant variations across the state.

4.5 Now is the time to rebuild the system. Improving the way the system works as a whole will make the responses to sexual violence more consistent, collaborative and supportive. This should reduce the trauma that people experience and make it more likely that people stay engaged with the system.

4.6 Setting up a structure that will drive improvement and bring people together to identify and address issues across the system will improve the ability of the justice system to respond to sexual offences.

4.7 There are four critical things that need to be done:

• strengthen the ability of specialist sexual assault services to play a more central role

• address tensions and differences in power between organisations

• ensure that everyone is, and feels like, a valued partner in a system that works together

• refocus on the goals and wishes of the people who experience sexual violence.

4.8 As discussed in Chapter 1, the Victorian Government has recently committed to a statewide Sexual Assault Strategy. This is an excellent opportunity for developing a structure that supports everyone to work together towards the same goals.

4.9 We should build on what we have learnt through other major reforms, such as Victoria’s family violence reforms, and build a system that embraces the work in preventing as well as responding to sexual violence. Although the focus of our inquiry is not primary prevention, we discuss its importance and make recommendations designed to reduce it in Chapter 3.

4.10 This chapter sets out the architecture for rebuilding the system. Chapter 5 then focuses on key interactions within the system, including how partners work together at a more practical level and with other key systems, such as family violence and child protection.

What is the first step to strengthen the system for responding to sexual violence?

What is the system for responding to sexual violence?

4.11 This chapter focuses on the ‘system for responding to sexual violence’ (the system). We use this term to refer to the networks of organisations that specialise in responding to sexual violence, including counselling services and those involved in the criminal justice response (see Figure 4). Chapters 3 and 8 discuss how this system relates to other systems and services.

Figure 4: The system responding to sexual violence and other services and systems

The system is under strain

4.12 A healthy system depends on the health of each of its parts. Throughout this inquiry, we heard that each part of the system was stretched (see box).

4.13 In Chapter 12, we discuss the strain on sexual assault services and victim support services. We heard of other victim support services, police, lawyers and prosecutors carrying high caseloads. There are also significant backlogs in courts (see Chapter 19).

4.14 The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has made the situation worse. A greater risk of family violence (including sexual violence) came when social services had to redesign the way they worked.^[8] Many systems, including the criminal justice system, were also hit hard, resulting in backlogs.

4.15 The first step in strengthening our responses to sexual violence must be to invest more resources. It takes time and effort to deliver a high-quality experience for people who have experienced sexual violence, so that they feel safer and able to stay engaged with the criminal justice system. This needs to be properly resourced.

4.16 Our recommendations rely on having a stronger system in place. Chapter 3 discusses community awareness and responses, and Chapter 8 discusses pathways to justice. It would be risky to encourage people to identify sexual violence, and seek support or justice, if the system cannot deliver when they need it. The reforms need to be sequenced so that it is ready to respond to an increase in demand.

4.17 Reforms demand resources and time so that people can change their ways of working. These changes also will take place at a time when there are many reforms happening across related systems, including family violence, aged care, and mental health (see Chapter 1).^[9]

Partnership should be a focus

4.18 A strong system needs strong foundations. For it to work effectively, organisations need to see each other as partners, and be strong enough to engage fully with each other as partners in the system.

4.19 There is, however, a missing partner in the current system. The role of health and human services, including specialist sexual assault services, needs to be strengthened. In other states, such as New South Wales and Queensland, the Department of Health plays a key role in partnership models between government agencies. This role includes responsibility for specialist sexual assault services, forensic medical examinations and education about sexual violence.^[10] These health and human services are key parts of our responses to sexual violence, but their importance is not reflected within the current system.

4.20 The Department of Families, Fairness and Housing is now responsible for specialist sexual assault services and is leading the work on Victoria’s sexual assault strategy. We welcome this as an opportunity to strengthen the focus on health and human services as part of a broader strategy on sexual violence and we consider that this Department should be recognised as a key partner in the system.

4.21 We also consider that specialist sexual assault services need to be resourced so they can play a stronger role within the system. These services are at the heart of Victoria’s response to sexual violence, but they are funded mainly to deliver therapeutic services. They do not have nearly enough funding to play a more systemic role. Their newly formed peak body, Sexual Assault Services Victoria (SAS Victoria), told us that it and its members would need funding ‘to implement in a systemic way education, advocacy, system and community awareness building, and continuous quality improvement’.^[11]

4.22 Forensic medical examinations (see Chapter 16) are also a health service. In other states and territories they are funded as a health service and are the responsibility of the Department of Health.^[12] The Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine (VIFM), which conducts forensic medical examinations in Victoria, is instead contracted on a fee-for-service basis by Victoria Police.^[13]

4.23 Associate Professor Gall, a clinical forensic physician, expressed concern that there was a ‘very clear’ conflict of interest for the justice system to be ‘the health carer of the complainant as well as the investigator’.^[14] Similar concerns in the United Kingdom led to forensic clinical services being transferred to the health system.^[15] In Chapter 16, we also discuss expanding forensic medical examinations. This may be easier to do within the health system.

4.24 While it is beyond the scope of this inquiry to address the departmental responsibilities for these services and the funding of health and human services, they affect the sustainability of our recommendations in this report. We therefore recommend that they should be reviewed, ideally as part of the Sexual Assault Strategy.

How can the system be rebuilt?

Parts need to connect to make a healthy system

4.25 A healthy system is more than the sum of its parts. In a healthy system, each part of the system recognises and respects their obligations to each other. They share a vision and an understanding of what they are trying to prevent and respond to. They are focused on meeting not just their own goals, but shared goals. The members of a healthy system provide information, data and feedback to each other to improve their processes.

4.26 In a healthy system, processes govern and monitor the interactions between the parts, and make sure that they are accountable to each other. Good practice is shared and embedded through protocols so that it becomes consistent everywhere. When challenges or disputes arise, a healthy system has structures in place to resolve them in a spirit of partnership.

4.27 In this inquiry, we identified multiple issues that are relevant to making a healthy system (see Table 3). We discuss further systemic issues below.

Table 3: Systemic issues identified in this report

There is an ‘urgent need’ to strengthen governance

4.28 In our issues paper, we asked if there was a need for a focus on governance and shared outcomes to improve relationships within the system,^[16] including the criminal justice system. We heard widespread support for this.

4.29 Sexual Assault Services Victoria told us there was an ‘urgent need’ for a governance framework that:

builds and regulates partnerships between agencies such as Victoria Police, VIFM [the Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine], Child Protection and [Sexual Assault Services Victoria], to work together on behalf of victim survivors. Under such a framework, any service delivery changes proposed by any partner in the sexual assault service system would need to be negotiated and endorsed prior to implementation. Collaborative arrangements and partnership agreements need to be systematised, and not personality, relationship or geography dependent.^[17]

4.30 Victoria Police supported ‘continual assessment of governance and achievement of shared outcomes’. It noted that ‘any updates or changes to these arrangements should include the development of primary prevention objectives, and continued commitment to shared victim-centric principles’, including ‘what such principles may look like for the various stages of the justice process and their own service delivery’.^[18]

4.31 The Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine told us that collaboration ‘means understanding where that service fits within the system and how it operates with the other services within the system’, and that it was ‘very interested’ in collaborating to ‘improve higher level governance’.^[19]

A revised governance framework is a priority

4.32 We recommend that the Victorian Government should revise the governance framework for the system for responding to sexual violence as a priority, so that everyone in the system can work together most effectively.

4.33 The most appropriate place to design a governance framework is within the Sexual Assault Strategy. This strategy will span primary prevention and secondary prevention, as well as the responses to sexual violence. The development of the strategy will include consultation processes to design the most effective system. The Sexual Assault Strategy is led by Family Safety Victoria, which is already involved with the overlapping governance structures, such as family violence, that we describe below.

4.34 However, as we have had the benefit of hearing from many people, we have included in our recommendation some aims and principles of a governance structure. We discuss key elements and some relevant models. We have also recorded what we heard from stakeholders.

What should be the aims of a revised governance structure?

Shared vision should be an aim

4.35 We need a shared vision so that everyone understands the broader purpose of what they are trying to achieve, beyond the aims of their own organisation or part of the system. For example, Queensland’s sexual assault prevention framework states that its vision is that ‘[e]veryone in Queensland lives free of the fear, threat or experience of sexual violence’.^[20]

4.36 Victoria’s future Sexual Assault Strategy (see Chapter 1) offers an ideal opportunity to set out this vision and a shared understanding of sexual violence. We expect that, as with the family violence strategy, this will include shared principles, aims and outcomes (see Figure 5). For example, Queensland’s sexual assault strategy includes as an aim that the ‘justice system is responsive to the needs of victims and survivors, and perpetrators are held to account for their actions’. This is reflected in the shared outcomes.^[21]

Figure 5: Victoria’s Family Violence Outcomes Framework

4.37 Shared outcomes help us identify what we want to achieve and measure our success. For example, they could include ‘specific areas of accountability for service delivery’ to key groups, such as children and young people, including those who are Aboriginal, have disabilities, are culturally and linguistically diverse, and/or LGBTIQA+.^[22]

4.38 In Chapter 6, we discuss the need for measures and indicators of progress against these shared outcomes. There should be public reporting so that ‘system leaders and the community … know if the reform is bringing about the benefits’ intended.^[23]

4.39 A shared vision with shared outcomes should also help frame cross-agency training (see Chapter 18). Different sectors have different perspectives on sexual violence. Understanding and bringing together these different perspectives is crucial.^[24]

Identifying and addressing systemic issues should be an aim

4.40 A key aim of a revised governance structure would be to enable organisations to identify and address emerging and systemic issues (see box). We have identified several issues throughout this report, including the need to:

• improve the consistency of data collection (see Chapter 6)

• understand and address the causes of delays and attrition^[25] (see Chapter 6 and 19)

• improve communication with those experiencing sexual violence through the criminal justice process (see Chapters 12 and 17).

4.41 The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, which caused rapid changes to service delivery, highlighted the need for a more formalised structure.^[27] There was no structure in place to deal with these changes in the system for responding to sexual violence. In contrast, in the family violence system, an operations group monitored the effects of the pandemic-related service responses and ensured strong information sharing and coordination.^[28]

Fostering collaboration should be an aim

4.42 A revised governance structure should provide a way for people to share information and identify opportunities for working together and for improving practice, including promoting good practice. There are examples of good practice that have not yet translated into common practice (see Chapter 5). These practices can be embedded through the multi-agency protocol we discuss later in this chapter.

4.43 We see opportunities, for example, for:

• developing and promoting shared information and resources (see Chapter 7)

• translating good practice adopted in multi-disciplinary centres (MDCs) into other collaborative arrangements (see Chapter 5)

• fostering relationships across agencies and organisations outside MDCs and across service systems (see Chapters 5 and 8).

4.44 A revised structure could make it easier to put together joint funding proposals. For example, such a structure would make it easier to identify the needs and resources for MDCs and other initiatives that depend upon collaboration across the system. A coordinated approach within and outside government will also help identify priorities for funding. We were told that a whole-of-government effort in responding to family violence, facilitated by a clear governance structure, was fundamental in securing successive budget bids.^[29]

4.45 This could, for example, make it easier for Child Protection and Victoria Police to work together to deal with online activity, or joint projects such as the Enhanced Response Model for Child Sexual Exploitation (see Chapter 5).^[30]

Ensuring accountability should be an aim

4.46 The work of the partners in the system for responding to sexual violence is closely connected. What happens in one place affects the work of the others and the experiences of victim survivors (see box).

4.47 A broad governance framework will ensure partners are accountable to each other and to the community. For example, family violence governance frameworks include a broad range of accountability mechanisms, including political accountability. Under the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic), the Minister for the Prevention of Family Violence must publish an annual report on implementing the MARAM framework (see Chapter 1).^[32]

4.48 We focus later in this chapter on accountability across the criminal justice system. We consider in Chapter 22 the need for accountability across all reforms related to sexual violence.

There are models for a revised governance structure

Previous governance arrangements were a good model

4.49 Some previous governance arrangements have worked well.^[33] A Statewide Steering Committee to Reduce Sexual Assault was established in 2003. It was jointly convened by Victoria Police and the Office of Women’s Policy and included high-level representatives from government, the criminal justice system, service providers and civil society (see Table 4).

Table 4: Membership of Statewide Steering Committee to Reduce Sexual Assault^[34]

4.50 The Committee’s terms of reference were to improve the safety of Victorian women and children by advising on:

• prevention, education and early intervention

• best practice within and between organisations, coordination between agencies, monitoring and evaluation

• responses of police, service providers, courts, media and the community

• the diverse needs and experiences of Victorian women and children.^[35]

4.51 Carolyn Worth (a former member of the Statewide Steering Committee to Reduce Sexual Assault) and Mary Lancaster submitted a detailed proposal for a committee like the Statewide Steering Committee. They proposed including those working in primary prevention and restorative justice. Their submission also proposed a Commission to sit alongside this committee (see Chapter 22).^[36]

Should the governance of sexual assault services align with family violence?

4.52 Another approach would be to build the governance of sexual assault strategies onto the existing governance structures for family violence. This is how it is done, for example, in Queensland.^[37]

4.53 Victoria has established a strong governance structure for family violence following the Royal Commission.^[38] Its elements include:

• ministerial responsibility, through the Minister for the Prevention of Family Violence and a Cabinet subcommittee

• a parliamentary committee (the Legal and Social Issues Standing Committee)

• whole-of-government coordination (including a Family Violence Reform Interdepartmental Committee that meets monthly)^[39]

• an advisory body to steer the development of reforms

• a coordination agency to deliver on reform (Family Safety Victoria)

• a primary prevention agency (Respect Victoria)

• representation of victim survivors (the Victim Survivors Advisory Council, discussed above)

• regional integration committees (discussed below)

• an independent implementation monitor (the Family Violence Implementation Monitor, discussed below).

4.54 The governance structure for family violence has been recently streamlined. Responsibilities for family violence now all sit within the new Department of Families, Fairness and Housing.^[40]

4.55 A separate governance structure for family violence exists under the Dhelk Dja partnership agreement with Aboriginal communities.^[41] There are overlapping governance frameworks for related reforms, such as national child sexual abuse reforms.

4.56 Building on the family governance model would involve both benefits and risks. Many of the same organisations are involved in both sectors. There would be advantages in ensuring that sexual assault reforms leverage, and align with, family violence reforms.

4.57 But there are risks in conflating family violence and sexual violence. We heard of the risks of making sexual violence the ‘poor cousin’ of family violence.^[42] We need to recognise what is different about it. Some patterns of violence are distinctive, such as child sexual exploitation. Some groups affected by sexual violence may feel left out of a framework that extends family violence frameworks. These concerns need to be addressed through careful design and consultation.

4.58 Whatever the governance structure, the Victorian Government needs to consider how it overlaps with family violence governance. It also needs to consider the overlaps with national governance frameworks such as the Child Sexual Abuse Strategy and sexual harassment reforms.

What are the key elements of a revised structure?

4.59 Although the design of the model is beyond the scope of this inquiry, we recommend including some key elements, which we discuss next. These are not comprehensive, but reflect what people told us, and lessons learnt from the family violence governance models.

Ministerial leadership is a key element

4.60 The Royal Commission on Family Violence identified a need for ministerial leadership, including to coordinate a whole-of-government approach. Having a Minister for the Prevention of Family Violence and a Cabinet subcommittee provides this.

4.61 In New South Wales, the Attorney-General is also the Minister for Domestic and Sexual Violence.^[43] In Queensland, the Attorney-General is also the Minister for the Prevention of Domestic and Family Violence.^[44]

4.62 We were told that what made the previous Family Violence Statewide Steering Committee effective, in part, was that ministers backed a whole-of-government approach.^[45]

A high-level statewide mechanism is a key element

4.63 The most obvious gap in current governance arrangements is the lack of a body that is collectively responsible for overseeing the system for responding to sexual violence. Currently, the main governance forum is a Sexual Offences Reference Group (SORG), which has been divided into two. Victoria Police chairs one of these, which includes service sector representatives.^[46] The other is a policy group that does not include sexual assault services.

4.64 The Gatehouse Centre, a specialist child sexual abuse service, told us that the SORG group that they are involved with has no government representatives senior enough to address systemic issues.^[47] In contrast, the previous Statewide Steering Committee’s membership was inclusive and comprised high-level representatives.

4.65 The recent refresh of the family violence governance structures replaced four steering committees working on specific projects with a Reform Board, internal to government, and a Reform Advisory Group with external representatives and the Dhelk Dja Partnership Forum and Victim Survivors’ Advisory Council.^[48] The lessons from these changes should be considered in the revision of the governance structure.

4.66 In Chapter 22, we also discuss the need for a body that can strengthen the state-wide mechanism by coordinating feedback between partners across the system, such as acting as a secretariat for the statewide governance structure.

Regional governance is a key element

4.67 Local and regional links between those involved in responding to sexual assault need to be strengthened.^[49] Stronger links will provide more consistent and continuous support for people experiencing sexual violence, helping them to stay engaged with the system. Stronger relationships will also help improve the response of the justice system, by enabling partners to share information and identify and fix emerging and systemic issues, such as changes in services or trends in sexual violence.

4.68 In some places, there is already a strong collaborative response, forged through individual effort rather than structures. For example, members of the Aboriginal community in Loddon Mallee reported that relationships there were already strong, because of the deep commitment of key people who had been around a long time.^[50]

4.69 While some regional areas have a local network, the strength of them varies.^[51] Further, it was not clear how local areas could elevate issues so they could be addressed across Victoria.

4.70 An obvious model is the Family Violence Regional Integration Committees. They bring together local representatives across the family violence system, including in prevention, early intervention and response. The Royal Commission recognised these committees as a key part of the governance structure.^[52]

4.71 These committees are convened by a principal strategic advisor funded by the Victorian Government.^[53] Advisors drive reforms, build partnerships and collaborate across sectors. They support the development of the workforce and provide insight into the issues and opportunities in their region.^[54]

4.72 The Royal Commission into Victoria’s Mental Health System has similarly recommended establishing Regional Mental Health and Wellbeing Boards to plan mental health services in their area and lead engagement with communities.^[55]

4.73 SAS Victoria noted that there were no parallel regional governance arrangements for sexual violence, other than in regions with a MDC (discussed in Chapter 5). It supported exploring these to ‘ensure regular multi-agency governance mechanisms to encourage collaboration … and a consistent systems response’.^[56]

4.74 In designing a regional governance model, similar structures to those in family violence or those representing culturally and linguistically diverse communities should be considered.^[57]

Putting lived experience at the heart is a key element

4.75 The voices and experiences of those who have experienced sexual violence must be at the heart of the new governance structure.^[58] This has been a key theme in related reforms.^[59]

4.76 These voices should shape legislation, policy and practice—not only when there is an inquiry, but continuously. To know how well the criminal justice system is performing, the people who have experienced it need to be asked about it, and to improve the system, their feedback should be listened to.

4.77 The Victim Survivors’ Advisory Council, a family violence body, provides a model for putting lived experiences at the heart of governance. The Minister for Prevention of Family Violence appoints its members. The Council advises government departments and inquiries. It has a secretariat that supports its participation.^[61]

Reflecting the diversity of experiences and contexts is a key element

4.78 The governance framework needs to reflect the diversity of experiences and contexts of sexual violence, and it needs to include community-based systems that respond to sexual violence (see Chapter 8).

4.79 The Victorian Aboriginal Child Care Agency told us that Aboriginal community-controlled organisations (ACCOs) must be involved in governance. It observed that standards could play an important role, such as the addendum it had developed to existing Human Services Standards.^[62]

4.80 The Victorian Multicultural Commission identified a need to incorporate multicultural and multi-faith groups as part of the ‘mainstream’. There is also scope to improve the use of multicultural legal advisory bodies at local and state government levels.^[63]

4.81 We recognise that there are challenges in designing structures that reflect this diversity. Many people who experience sexual violence are often not in a position to take part in governance because of unequal patterns of power (see Chapter 2). Representing your community takes resources that many, such as newly arrived refugees, women in prison or children and young people, will not have. In designing any high-level mechanism, we need to correct for those power imbalances. This may include reaching out beyond organisations, and funding participation in policy making by those who would not otherwise have a seat at the table.

Regulation and reporting across other sectors are key elements

4.82 Sexual violence often happens in places that are regulated in other ways. There are regulatory bodies responsible for sexual violence within specific contexts that include:

• mental health

• the sex industry

• aged care

• disability services

• out-of-home care for children

• organisations that come into contact with children (see box).

4.83 The Victorian Government is establishing a new regulator for those providing social services, including sexual assault, family violence, and homelessness services. This regulatory scheme, expected to start in 2023, will monitor these publicly funded services against proposed standards.^[70]

4.84 While these regulatory responses are beyond the scope of this inquiry, they could prevent and reduce the risk of sexual violence and may meet at least some justice needs outside a criminal context. For example, one person told us that the main reason they reported the incident to police was to prevent their rapist from becoming a teacher, even though they were reluctant to go through the criminal justice process.^[71]

4.85 Regulatory responses also provide more systemic ways for diverse experiences of sexual violence to be reported. This could be help address low reporting rates in some communities, by shifting the focus away from individual reporting.

4.86 We heard of many opportunities to improve sexual safety by preventing or reducing the risk of sexual violence and by improving responses to sexual violence in particular contexts. We discuss some examples of what we heard next.

The sex industry

4.87 Women working in the sex industry told us that there were many measures that could prevent sexual violence or respond more effectively to it within the sex industry (see also Chapter 8). These included training management, security and staff; adopting an internal complaints process; consistent and universal policies across the sex industry; and a monitoring body that could report if venues were not complying with these policies. They told us that, while Consumer Affairs Victoria was meant to be monitoring, this was ‘done inconsistently or handed to another body to do’.^[72]

4.88 Project Respect told us that there needed to be measures and processes under licensing requirements and occupational health and safety standards for the sex industry, so that business owners were aware of their obligations to report suspected sexual offences.^[73]

4.89 Sex Work Law Reform told us that WorkSafe officers could refer suspected offences to police, but did not receive any training, and that its officers have been known to think the work was ‘titillating’ or not serious.^[74]

Mental health services in inpatient units

4.90 Many people do not feel or are not sexually safe when accessing acute mental health inpatient treatment.^[75] There is work underway to address this, including guidelines to promote sexual safety,^[76] training for mental health services and funded improvements to the safety of inpatient units (see Chapter 7).^[77]

4.91 Following a report on sexual safety by the Mental Health Complaints Commissioner (MHCC) in 2018,^[78] work has begun on a sexual safety strategy.^[79] The sexual safety guidelines are also being revised.^[80] The Commissioner has also sought responses from services on their compliance with recommendations.^[81]

4.92 The MHCC continues to call for more transparent reporting and accountability by, for example, reporting on sexual safety breach indicators in statewide reports, and including sexual safety breaches in the Statement of Priorities for services.^[82] We also heard that a code of conduct could be developed to address non-compliance with standards of reporting at mental health services through regular meetings.^[83]

4.93 The Royal Commission into Victoria’s Mental Health System has made more recent recommendations, including to address gender-based violence in mental health facilities. It also recommended establishing a Mental Health and Wellbeing Commission that will have complaints and oversight functions. One of its priorities will be to monitor the incidence of gender-based violence in mental health facilities. It also recommended a Mental Health Improvement Unit to lead quality and safety improvements in mental health and wellbeing services.^[84]

Aged care

4.94 We heard similar concerns about the risks of sexual violence in aged care (see Chapter 6). Aged care is regulated at a federal level.^[85] This may contribute to the lack of visibility of sexual assault in aged care.^[86]

4.95 Sexual abuse was previously reported under the reportable assaults scheme to the Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission (ACQSC). However, following the Australian Law Reform Commission’s (ALRC) report into elder abuse, this has been replaced by a Serious Incident Response Scheme (SIRS). The SIRS scheme began on 1 April 2021.^[87]

4.96 The key changes are:

• The scheme requires reports of serious incidents committed by another resident, including those with a cognitive impairment, as well as by a staff member.^[88]

• The emphasis has changed from reporting to requiring an investigation and response.

• The investigation and response is monitored by an independent oversight body.^[89]

4.97 The ALRC also recommended strengthening screening requirements for employees, including a national employment process and a requirement for unregistered workers to abide by the National Code of Conduct for Health Care Workers.^[90]

4.98 One of the types of incident that must be reported to the regulator is unlawful sexual contact or inappropriate sexual conduct. This includes suspected or alleged incidents. However, the Health Law and Ageing Research Unit expressed concern that the new scheme left it to aged-care staff to interpret the seriousness of the incident, and that the aged-care regulator was not an appropriate body either to interpret the seriousness of the incident or to analyse the data.^[91]

4.99 As with mental health, aged care is undergoing significant reform. The Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety reported in March 2021 and recommended an overhaul of the regulation of aged care.^[92] However, despite submissions about sexual violence, it did not make any recommendations specific to sexual violence.^[93]

Connecting regulatory responses

4.100 These different regulatory contexts are unique, but there are common themes. For example, in Chapter 7, we note recommendations from recent inquiries that aim to make it easier for people to report sexual violence within institutions. As we also discuss in that chapter, we heard concerns that Victoria Police may not always investigate complaints of sexual violence reported by regulatory or other bodies (see Chapter 7). We also heard concerns that data about sexual violence is not collected or used in these contexts (see Chapter 6).

4.101 In many of these contexts, the real opportunity to prevent and respond to sexual violence will be regulatory, rather than through the criminal justice system. We heard many practical suggestions for improving sexual safety in these contexts that could make a real difference. Inquiries, including royal commissions, have also made recommendations that may be useful in other regulatory contexts.^[94]

4.102 However, too often good practice and lessons learnt are not being shared across regulatory contexts. Regulatory responses are not aligned to an overarching strategy or connected to the system for responding to sexual violence.

4.103 We therefore recommend that a working group should be formed of regulators under the auspices of a revised governance structure, as part of the Sexual Assault Strategy. This would have the aim of sharing information and best practice and aligning and coordinating this work, including with key partners in the system for responding to sexual violence.

4.104 The working group should:

• map existing plans, protocols and initiatives to improve sexual safety

• share good practices and resources

• work with people who have lived experience and with specialists in responding to sexual violence through the revised governance structure

• identify ways to improve sexual safety in their contexts as part of an overarching Sexual Assault Strategy, including by working together to implement recommendations from inquiries on improving pathways to reporting

• identify a consistent way of collecting data about the investigation of reports made under regulatory schemes to police, and of working with Victoria Police to improve their responses

• review or develop protocols, guidance and training that improve responses to disclosures of sexual violence and clarify regulatory reporting requirements (see Chapter 7)

• be guided by the revised statewide governance mechanism and keep it informed of the working group’s work and relevant reforms.

A multi-agency protocol should translate law and policy into practice

Protocols set out how to work together

4.105 During this inquiry, we heard about gaps between policy and practice, and the variability of practice across the state. For example, we heard concerns about:

• inconsistent referrals to and between specialist and community-based services (see Chapters 5 and 8)

• the experience of reporting to police (see Chapter 17)

• communication about the progress of the case (see Chapter 17)

• delay (see Chapter 19).

4.106 As those chapters discuss, these gaps and inconsistencies can have profound effects on how people experience the criminal justice system, and their willingness to continue engaging with it.

4.107 SAS Victoria identified the need to translate law and policy into consistent practice. For this, protocols are needed.^[96]

4.108 Protocols set out how people should work together. They set out how each partner sees each other, who is responsible for what, and state clearly their commitment to work together to improve the response to sexual violence. Protocols make it clear:

• who does what

• who informs and communicates with victim survivors, and how

• when other people should be involved

• how to provide feedback and identify areas to improve.

4.109 A protocol would identify key interactions between partners, and common issues in those interactions (see box).^[97] It would set out transparently what should be done and when, to ensure consistency across Victoria.

4.110 A protocol could help improve feedback processes. Feedback should be heard and acted upon, and key partners should learn lessons from each other’s experiences.

4.111 For example, there is a lack of communication between forensic examiners, police and lawyers in sexual offence cases.^[101] Associate Professor Gall told us that forensic medical officers get very little information before giving evidence, and they receive no feedback about the value of the specimens they collected.^[102]

4.112 A protocol could clarify how people who have experienced sexual violence can give feedback about the response of services. Some work on victim survivor feedback has already been done by Victoria Police and the Office of Public Prosecutions.^[103]

4.113 A protocol would include opportunities for feedback by victim advocates (see Chapter 12) and by other services. For example, we heard that Rainbow Door, which connects LGBTIQA+ people to mainstream services, provides feedback to those services about how its clients are treated.^[104]

Victoria Police Code of Practice sets out some processes

4.114 Victoria Police has a Code of Practice that sets out processes for police in some detail.^[105] However, the Code focuses on the obligations of police, centres against sexual assault and forensic services are not partners to, and do not have obligations under, the Code. Importantly, there are no mechanisms under the Code to hold the police to account if they do not meet those obligations.

4.115 Victoria Police has a protocol with Child Protection on child sexual abuse, with an addendum that addresses child sexual exploitation. We make recommendations in Chapter 5 to strengthen protocols involving child sexual abuse.

4.116 We recommend building on these codes and protocols by:

• strengthening the detail of the protocols

• making sure they include all key agencies, including non-government agencies, as partners.

There are models of multi-agency protocols

The Sexual Assault Response Team (SART) is a good model

4.117 A model for a more thorough approach is the Sexual Assault Response Team (SART) in the United States.

4.118 The SART approach uses a team to provide an immediate response, usually combining law enforcement, medical and legal responses, and community-based advocacy. It may be paired with a broader coordinated community response, which brings together more people in the community to prevent and reduce sexual assault. For example, this broader response may include schools, faith groups and other social services coming together to plan activities to raise community awareness or identify gaps in services.^[106]

4.119 While SARTs are common in the United States, the way they work varies widely. They commonly include police, rape crisis centres, prosecutors and forensic nurses, but they can involve a wider range of organisations. An empirical review found that most SARTs had a high degree of structure and cross-system coordination.^[107]

4.120 SART models often use cross-agency training and collaborative meetings to discuss local responses. This may include reviews of individual cases. They may engage in quality assurance or formal evaluation. However, SART models are also often driven by communities without their own funding, which can pose challenges.^[108]

4.121 As with other multi-agency models (see Chapter 5), research indicates SARTs improve the effectiveness of responses to sexual violence. More research is needed to identify which elements or models work best,^[109] although research suggests there may be benefits to more formal structures, especially those that include evaluation and more broadly based memberships.^[110]

4.122 A key part of the SART model is to develop a local protocol between its members, based on existing services, community needs and the feedback of people who have experienced sexual violence.^[111] Some states provide a model protocol which defines the relationship between partners and specifies the roles of partners (see, for an example, Figure 6).^[112] Some model protocols identify key considerations in developing a local protocol, while others provide a template that can be customised for local needs.^[113]

Figure 6: Roles and responsibilities of victim advocates checklist, from Georgia

SART guide^[114]

Roles And Responsibilities Checklists

Advocate Roles And Responsibilities Checklist

Determine whether the victim is safe (both physically and emotionally) and provide safety planning if needed

Determine the immediate medical care needs of the victim and whether the victim wants to go to the hospital or another medical provider for STI/pregnancy care

Assess and accommodate the special needs of the victim, including but not limited to language or cultural barriers, physical, mental, age, gender, rural, etc.

Provide crisis intervention, support, information and referrals to the victim and family/friends

Provide non-judgmental information about options

Determine whether the victim wants to report the assault

If not reporting, provide information on the evidence collection timeline and how it affects the victim’s future options

If reporting, contact law enforcement or follow SART protocol

Provide transportation to medical facility for medical evaluation if necessary

Inform victim of preserving options through evidence collection and evaluation

Assess whether victim has need of clothing/food/shelter/transportation

Access services and resources for victim or assist them in accessing services and resources as needed

Accompany, support, and provide information throughout all aspects of the process

 Provide continuing follow-up care after the initial response by regularly checking-in with victim on their needs, concerns, comfort, and questions

Ensure the victim understands the systems in which they find themselves, including the roles and objectives of each agency and individual involved in the response

Serve as a liaison between the victim and professional agencies

Advocate on behalf of the victim’s self-defined needs, decisions, wishes, questions/concerns

Provide support, information, and referrals to family/friends of the victim

Provide accompaniment when requested (FME, courtroom, etc.)

4.123 Some protocols include clear accountability mechanisms. The model protocol in Georgia, for example, establishes a child abuse protocol committee headed by a judge which must meet twice annually. The committee must prepare an annual report on compliance and measures to improve it, as well as reporting on which measures have been successful in preventing child abuse.^[115]

There are other models of protocols

4.124 Other models can provide some guidance. For example, Orange Doors are developing ‘interface’ arrangements with other key stakeholders.

4.125 Guidelines establishing minimum statewide requirements will define how Orange Doors work with other organisations, including courts and community-based services.^[116] Each local area will then use these as a basis for developing their own procedures.

4.126 The guidelines for Orange Doors for working with Victoria Police set out referral pathways, including the timeframes for responding and referrals for children and young people and Aboriginal people. It sets out when an Orange Door and Victoria Police can work together to manage risks for victims of family violence, and how to resolve disputes.^[117]

4.127 Another model is the interagency guidelines developed by the Queensland Government for responding to sexual assault. These outline the responsibilities of police, Queensland Health, the justice department and the department that funds sexual support services. The guidelines set out general processes and key considerations in responding to sexual assault. These include responsibilities for each partner in relation to referrals and feedback. The guidelines are reviewed every two years.^[118]

We recommend a multi-agency protocol

4.128 One of the key tasks of the high-level statewide governance mechanism should be to develop a model multi-agency protocol. While we do not specify here the precise content of this protocol, it should include these key elements:

• a statement of the role and responsibilities of each partner

• a commitment to working collaboratively according to overarching principles

• processes that specify who is responsible at key points and how people should interact with each other

• timeframes for interactions

• processes that clarify who is responsible for communicating with the person who has experienced sexual violence (see Chapter 17)

• guidance on flexible arrangements for reporting and taking statements (see Chapter 17)

• processes that clarify when, how and to whom referrals are to be made, including to the after-hours Sexual Assault Crisis Line (see Chapter 5)

• addressing the use of intervention orders (see Chapter 17)

• processes for ensuring feedback to each other and for continual improvement, including the need to identify and address causes of delay (see Chapter 19)

• processes for resolving disputes and ensuring regular review of the protocol and compliance with the protocol.

4.129 This model protocol should then be used as a guide or template and adapted at a local level.

4.130 To ensure that the protocol translates into practice, there should be accountability measures to track and address compliance with the protocol.^[124] We address this next.

We need accountability for the experiences of victims of crime

The Victims’ Charter Act and Commissioner’s role should be strengthened

4.131 A key concern for this inquiry is ensuring accountability within the criminal justice system for the experiences of victim survivors. Improving those experiences is key to reducing their trauma, improving their engagement with the criminal justice system, and reducing barriers to reporting. There is already an established framework of accountability in this area.

4.132 The Victims’ Charter Act sets out principles that govern the response by criminal justice and government agencies to victims of crime (see Table 5). It also establishes requirements for the monitoring and review of those principles.^[125] The Charter’s principles apply to organisations in the criminal justice system and victims’ services agencies.^[126]

Table 5: Principles of the Victims Charter Act^[127]

4.133 The Victims of Crime Commissioner is responsible for oversight and monitoring of the Act.^[128] The Commissioner is an independent statutory officer whose role is to:

• advocate for the recognition, inclusion, participation and respect of victims of crime by government, the police and the prosecution

• inquire and report to ministers into issues affecting groups of, or many, victims of crime in Victoria

• advise ministers, government and organisations on how to improve the justice system to better meet the needs of victims of crime

• consider complaints from victims about organisations that investigate, prosecute or provide services to victims of crime under the Victims’ Charter Act.^[129]

4.134 In this inquiry, we heard many concerns directly related to the Charter, or that reflect specific applications of its principles. These include:

• the need for more consistent referrals from police to counsellor advocates to ensure people receive support (see Chapter 5)

• the obligations of police and prosecution to consult victims of crime before ending cases (see Chapter 17)

• obligations to communicate with the person experiencing sexual violence throughout the criminal justice process (see Chapter 17).

4.135 Similar codes or charters for victims of crime in the United Kingdom confer further rights in relation to sexual and some other types of offences. In Scotland, this includes the right to specify the gender of the police interviewer and the forensic medical examiner (see Chapters 16 and 17).^[130]

4.136 In England and Wales, the Victims’ Code includes provision for ‘enhanced rights’ for some types of victim, including those who have been a victim of sexual offences. For example, those with ‘enhanced rights’ have the right to be referred to specialist supports and informed more quickly about the investigation and prosecution.^[131]

4.137 In this report, we recommend extending the rights in the Victims’ Charter Act. We explain in the chapters listed why the following rights should be included:

• strengthening the existing right to be referred to support in cases of sexual offences to require an agency to refer a person to support services within a timeframe set out in the local protocol (see Chapter 5)

• a new right to specify the gender of the police interviewer and the forensic medical examiner, where it is reasonably practical to comply (see Chapter 17)

• a new right to flexible arrangements for interviewing, where it is reasonably practical to comply (see Chapter 17)

• a new right to request an independent review of a decision by police or prosecution to discontinue or not file charges or indictments after an internal review (see Chapter 17)

• a new right to interpretation and translation (see Chapter 15)

• a right to special protections including, if implemented, the right to pre-recorded evidence (see Chapter 21)^[132]

• a right to be notified of applications to introduce confidential communications or evidence of sexual history and to be heard on those applications (see Chapter 21)^[133]

• if implemented, a right to funded legal representation for applications to introduce confidential communications or evidence of sexual history (see Chapter 21)

• if implemented, a new right to be referred to restorative justice (see Chapter 9).

4.138 There are some clear advantages of extending or detailing the rights in the Victims’ Charter Act to enhance rights for victim survivors of sexual offences. First, it would enshrine in the law our expectations of how they should be treated. This would send a powerful signal to the public and to the agencies required to comply with the Charter.

4.139 Secondly, it could drive change within agencies to meet those requirements, while giving them the flexibility to determine how to meet them in a practical sense.

4.140 Thirdly, the Charter includes an accountability mechanism through the Victims of Crime Commissioner, who has powers to require information from agencies and review complaints from victim survivors. This is an independent accountability mechanism with a mandate to focus on the experiences of victim survivors.

4.141 The Victims of Crime Commissioner has powers to produce systemic reports on victims of crime.^[134] The Commissioner recently announced her first systemic inquiry, on the participation of victims in the justice system.^[135]

4.142 We consider that the Victims of Crime Commissioner is ideally placed to ensure accountability within the criminal justice system to victim survivors. This could also ensure the flow of feedback from victim survivors into the criminal justice system.

4.143 We recognise that the office of the Victims of Crime Commissioner has not yet fulfilled its potential, partly because of a lack of awareness of its existence and role, and a lack of resourcing.^[136] This role is, however, being strengthened through increased powers, some increased resourcing, and the appointment in mid-2019 of a Commissioner with longstanding expertise in domestic violence.^[137]

4.144 While the Victims of Crime Commissioner’s existing mandate and powers provide an excellent foundation for that office to play a role in ensuring accountability, we see two ways to strengthen this role further.

4.145 First, the Commissioner could play an ongoing role in monitoring compliance. For example, the family violence reform implementation monitor reviews and monitors the progress of an agency against the Implementation Plan that is published by the responsible minister, and publishes reports that are tabled in parliament.^[138]

4.146 We heard from the monitor that a valuable aspect of its work was sharing its findings with agencies to improve their practice.^[139] We see potential for a similar model with the Victims of Crime Commissioner, with the multi-agency protocol proposed in this chapter to be published under the the Victims’ Charter Act and monitored by the Victims of Crime Commissioner.

4.147 Secondly, the Commissioner already publishes annual reports and can conduct systemic inquiries. An annual report on compliance with the protocol would increase transparency and accountability. Reports could be like the implementation reports published by the monitor, which are tabled in parliament. They could include key data and commentary about the criminal justice system.

4.148 This strengthened role should be enshrined in the legislation establishing the Victims of Crime Commissioner. Such a reform would go a long way to ensuring accountability under the revised governance framework. To fulfil this role effectively, the office of the Commissioner will need to be resourced properly.

4.149 In Chapter 22, we recommend establishing an independent body, such a Commission for Sexual Safety, with a broader scope than the role we propose here for the Victims of Crime Commissioner. We discuss there how the strengthened role of the Victims of Crime Commissioner should feed into and complement that work in that chapter.

1. Submission 17 (Sexual Assault Services Victoria).

   ↑

2. Submission 20 (Anonymous member of the Aboriginal community).

   ↑

3. Consultation 63 (A victim survivor of sexual assault, name withheld).

   ↑

4. Consultation 59 (Ashleigh Rae, Nicole Lee, Penny).

   ↑

5. Victorian Law Reform Commission, Improving the Response of the Justice System to Sexual Offences: Summary of Responses to Online Feedback Form from People with Experience of Sexual Assault (Report, April 2021).

   ↑

6. Consultation 56 (Cecilia, a victim survivor of sexual assault).

   ↑

7. Consultation 69 (Deborah, a victim survivor of sexual assault).

   ↑

8. Family Violence Reform Implementation Monitor, Report of the Family Violence Reform Implementation Monitor (Report, 1 November 2020) 113, 119–20 <http://www.fvrim.vic.gov.au/fourth-report-parliament-1-november-2020-tabled-may-2021>.

   ↑

9. Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety (Final Report, 1 March 2021) <https://agedcare.royalcommission.gov.au/publications/final-report>; Royal Commission into Family Violence: Report and Recommendations (Final Report, March 2016) <http://rcfv.archive.royalcommission.vic.gov.au/Report-Recommendations.html>; Royal Commission into Victoria’s Mental Health System (Final Report, 3 February 2021) <https://finalreport.rcvmhs.vic.gov.au/>.

   ↑

10. See, eg, Queensland Government, Response to Sexual Assault: Queensland Government Interagency Guidelines for Responding to People Who Have Experienced Sexual Assault (Report, June 2014) <https://www.publications.qld.gov.au/dataset/1f7ea4ec-bec8-4428-ab60-0a6c119ac70d/resource/3b3958c9-504f-4698-a64d-e56ca7e5248e/download/qld-govt-guidelines-for-responding-to-sexual-assualt.pdf>; ‘The Joint Child Protection Response Program (JCPRP)’, Communities and Justice (NSW) (Web Page, 24 December 2020) <https://www.facs.nsw.gov.au/providers/children-families/child-protection-services/joint-child-protection-response>.

    ↑

11. Submission 17 (Sexual Assault Services Victoria).

    ↑

12. See, eg, Daniele Bird (Acting Auditor-General), Delivering Forensic Services (Report No 21 2018–19, Queensland Audit Office, 27 June 2019) 53.

    ↑

13. Submission 61 (Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine).

    ↑

14. Submission 11 (Associate Professor John AM Gall).

    ↑

15. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland, Strategic Overview of Provision of Forensic Medical Services to Victims of Sexual Crime (Report, March 2017) <https://www.hmics.scot/sites/default/files/publications/HMICS%20Strategic%20Overview%20of%20Provision%20of%20Forensic%20Medical%20Services%20to%20Victims%20of%20Sexual%20Crime.pdf>; Vivien Stern, The Stern Review: An Independent Review into How Rape Complaints Are Handled by Public Authorities in England and Wales (Report, Home Office (UK), 2010) 19.

    ↑

16. Victorian Law Reform Commission, Working Together to Respond to Sexual Offences: Systems (Issues Paper A, October 2020) Question 6.

    ↑

17. Submission 17 (Sexual Assault Services Victoria).

    ↑

18. Submission 68 (Victoria Police).

    ↑

19. Submission 61 (Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine).

    ↑

20. Queensland Government, Prevent. Support. Believe. Queensland’s Framework to Address Sexual Violence (Policy, 15 October 2018) 14–15 <https://www.csyw.qld.gov.au/violence-prevention/sexual-violence-prevention/sexual-violence-prevention-framework>.

    ↑

21. Ibid 15.

    ↑

22. Submission 57 (Commission for Children and Young People (Vic)).

    ↑

23. Family Violence Reform Implementation Monitor, Report of the Family Violence Reform Implementation Monitor (Report, 1 November 2020) 149 <http://www.fvrim.vic.gov.au/fourth-report-parliament-1-november-2020-tabled-may-2021>.

    ↑

24. Submission 10 (Carolyn Worth AM and Mary Lancaster).

    ↑

25. For example, the previous Statewide Steering Committee to Reduce Sexual Assault commissioned research on attrition: see Statewide Steering Committee to Reduce Sexual Assault, Study of Reported Rapes in Victoria 2000–2003 (Summary Research Report, July 2006) <https://apo.org.au/node/8211>.

    ↑

26. Submission 71 (Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine and Victorian Forensic Paediatric Medical Service).

    ↑

27. For example, forensic medical services were restricted: see Submissions 11 (Associate Professor John AM Gall), 61 (Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine). This is discussed in Ch 16.

    ↑

28. Family Violence Reform Implementation Monitor, Report of the Family Violence Reform Implementation Monitor (Report, 1 November 2020) 114 <http://www.fvrim.vic.gov.au/fourth-report-parliament-1-november-2020-tabled-may-2021>.

    ↑

29. Consultation 88 (Victims of Crime Commissioner).

    ↑

30. Consultation 57 (Department of Health and Human Services).

    ↑

31. Submission 17 (Sexual Assault Services Victoria).

    ↑

32. Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic) s 193.

    ↑

33. See, eg, Submissions 10 (Carolyn Worth AM and Mary Lancaster), 61 (Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine); Consultation 89 (Sexual Assault Services Victoria (No 2)).

    ↑

34. For the full membership, see Statewide Steering Committee to Reduce Sexual Assault, Study of Reported Rapes in Victoria 2000–2003 (Summary Research Report, July 2006) Appendix 2 <https://apo.org.au/node/8211>.

    ↑

35. For the full terms of reference: see ibid Appendix 1.

    ↑

36. Submission 10 (Carolyn Worth AM and Mary Lancaster).

    ↑

37. Queensland Government, Prevent. Support. Believe. Queensland’s Framework to Address Sexual Violence (Policy, 15 October 2018) 4 <https://www.csyw.qld.gov.au/violence-prevention/sexual-violence-prevention/sexual-violence-prevention-framework>.

    ↑

38. Email from Family Safety Victoria to Victorian Law Reform Commission, 30 April 2021); Victorian Government, ‘Establish a Governance Structure for Implementing the Commission’s Recommendations’, VIC.GOV.AU (Web Page, 18 May 2020) <http://www.vic.gov.au/family-violence-recommendations/establish-governance-structure-implementing-commissions>. There is also an Industry Taskforce that advises on family violence workforce issues.

    ↑

39. Family Violence Reform Implementation Monitor, Report of the Family Violence Reform Implementation Monitor (Report, 1 November 2020) 114 <http://www.fvrim.vic.gov.au/fourth-report-parliament-1-november-2020-tabled-may-2021>.

    ↑

40. Ibid 37.

    ↑

41. Victorian Government, Dhelk Dja: Safe Our Way—Strong Culture, Strong Peoples, Strong Families (Agreement, October 2018) <http://www.vic.gov.au/dhelk-dja-partnership-aboriginal-communities-address-family-violence>.

    ↑

42. Submission 20 (Anonymous member of the Aboriginal community).

    ↑

43. ‘Attorney General, and Minister for the Prevention of Domestic and Sexual Violence’, NSW Government (Web Page, 2021) <https://www.nsw.gov.au/nsw-government/contact-a-minister/attorney-general-and-minister-for-prevention-of-domestic-and-sexual-violence>.

    ↑

44. Queensland Government, ‘Our Minister’, Department of Justice and Attorney-General (Web Page, 16 November 2020) <https://www.justice.qld.gov.au/about-us/minister>.

    ↑

45. Consultation 88 (Victims of Crime Commissioner).

    ↑

46. Submission 14 (Gatehouse Centre, Royal Children’s Hospital)..

    ↑

47. Ibid.

    ↑

48. Family Violence Reform Implementation Monitor, Report of the Family Violence Reform Implementation Monitor (Report, 1 November 2020) 148–9 <http://www.fvrim.vic.gov.au/fourth-report-parliament-1-november-2020-tabled-may-2021>.

    ↑

49. See Submission 10 (Carolyn Worth AM and Mary Lancaster).

    ↑

50. Consultation 67 (Loddon Mallee Regional Aboriginal Justice Advisory Committee).

    ↑

51. See Submission 10 (Carolyn Worth AM and Mary Lancaster) (for child protection).

    ↑

52. Royal Commission into Family Violence: Report and Recommendations (Final Report, March 2016) Recommendation 193 <http://rcfv.archive.royalcommission.vic.gov.au/Report-Recommendations.html>.

    ↑

53. These are also sometimes referred to as Regional Integration Coordinators. They are administered by Family Safety Victoria: see Family Violence Reform Implementation Monitor, Report of the Family Violence Reform Implementation Monitor (Report, 1 November 2020) 37 <http://www.fvrim.vic.gov.au/fourth-report-parliament-1-november-2020-tabled-may-2021>.

    ↑

54. The Lookout, Family Violence Regional Integration: Driving Greater Integration of Regional Family Violence Responses (Factsheet, December 2017) <https://www.thelookout.org.au/family-violence-workers/regional-integration>.

    ↑

55. Royal Commission into Victoria’s Mental Health System (Final Report, 3 February 2021) Recommendation 4 <https://finalreport.rcvmhs.vic.gov.au/>.

    ↑

56. Submission 17 (Sexual Assault Services Victoria).

    ↑

57. See, eg, Submission 54 (Victorian Multicultural Commission).

    ↑

58. See Submission 56 (Domestic Violence Victoria).

    ↑

59. See, eg, Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety (Final Report, 1 March 2021) Recommendation 94 <https://agedcare.royalcommission.gov.au/publications/final-report>; Royal Commission into Victoria’s Mental Health System (Final Report, 3 February 2021) Recommendation 28. See also Recommendation 29 <https://finalreport.rcvmhs.vic.gov.au/>.

    ↑

60. Consultation 56 (Cecilia, a victim survivor of sexual assault).

    ↑

61. The model of this Council will be refreshed under Victoria’s most recent rolling action plan on family violence reform: Victorian Government, Family Violence Reform Rolling Action Plan 2020–2023: Activities Index (Combined Activity Summary) 14 <https://www.vic.gov.au/family-violence-reform-rolling-action-plan-2020-2023>.

    ↑

62. Submission 21 (Victorian Aboriginal Child Care Agency).

    ↑

63. Submission 54 (Victorian Multicultural Commission).

    ↑

64. Child Wellbeing and Safety Act 2005 (Vic) pt 5A. This followed the recommendation of the Family and Community Development Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Betrayal of Trust: Inquiry into the Handling of Child Abuse by Religious and Other Non-Government Organisations (Parliamentary Paper No 275, November 2013) <https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/58th-parliament/fcdc/inquiries/article/1788>.

    ↑

65. Child Wellbeing and Safety Act 2005 (Vic) s 3 definition of ‘reportable conduct’. While specified organisations must report, anyone can report their concerns: ss 16L, 16M.

    ↑

66. Commission for Children and Young People (Vic), Annual Report 2019–20 (Report, 10 December 2020) 83 <https://ccyp.vic.gov.au/about-the-commission/annual-reports/>. Of the allegations of sexual offences, 19% were substantiated: ibid 93.

    ↑

67. Child Wellbeing and Safety Act 2005 (Vic) ss 16O–16W.

    ↑

68. Commission for Children and Young People (Vic), Annual Report 2019–20 (Report, 10 December 2020) 96 <https://ccyp.vic.gov.au/about-the-commission/annual-reports/>. Police investigated 58% of all cases notified to them, and in 46% of all cases notified to police the investigation was completed with no further police action, and in 7% of cases criminal charges were laid or pending, with a further 8% under investigation or awaiting an update: ibid.

    ↑

69. Child Wellbeing and Safety Act 2005 (Vic) s 16U.

    ↑

70. Victorian Government, Sector Update on Social Services Regulation Reform (Report, June 2021) <https://fac.dhhs.vic.gov.au/news/regulation-reform-update>; Victorian Government, ‘Introducing Social Services Regulation Reform’, Funded Agency Channel (Web Page, 9 March 2021) <https://fac.dhhs.vic.gov.au/news/introducing-social-services-regulation-reform>.

    ↑

71. Consultation 63 (A victim survivor of sexual assault, name withheld).

    ↑

72. Consultation 34 (Project Respect Women’s Advisory Group).

    ↑

73. Submission 50 (Project Respect).

    ↑

74. Consultation 45 (Sex Work Law Reform Victoria).

    ↑

75. Toni Ashmore, Jo Spangaro and Lorna McNamara, ‘“I Was Raped by Santa Claus”: Responding to Disclosures of Sexual Assault in Mental Health Inpatient Facilities’ (2015) 24(2) International Journal of Mental Health Nursing 139, 139.

    ↑

76. Department of Health (Vic), Promoting Sexual Safety, Responding to Sexual Activity, and Managing Allegations of Sexual Assault in Adult Acute Inpatient Units (Chief Psychiatrist’s Guideline, June 2012) <https://www2.health.vic.gov.au:443/about/key-staff/chief-psychiatrist/chief-psychiatrist-guidelines/promoting-sexual-safety>.

    ↑

77. Mental Health Complaints Commissioner (Vic), The Right to Be Safe: Ensuring Sexual Safety in Acute Mental Health Inpatient Units: Responses from Services to Project Recommendations (Report, May 2020) 1–2 <https://www.mhcc.vic.gov.au/mental-health-service-responses-our-sexual-safety-report>.

    ↑

78. Mental Health Complaints Commissioner (Vic), The Right to Be Safe: Ensuring Sexual Safety in Acute Mental Health Inpatient Units (Sexual Safety Project Report, March 2018) <https://www.mhcc.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-01/The-right-to-be-safe-sexual-safety-project-report.pdf>.

    ↑

79. Mental Health Complaints Commissioner (Vic), The Right to Be Safe: Ensuring Sexual Safety in Acute Mental Health Inpatient Units: Responses from Services to Project Recommendations (Report, May 2020) 3 <https://www.mhcc.vic.gov.au/mental-health-service-responses-our-sexual-safety-report>.

    ↑

80. Office of the Chief Psychiatrist, Annual Report 2019–20 (Report, October 2020) 24–5 <https://www2.health.vic.gov.au/about/key-staff/chief-psychiatrist/annual-reports>.

    ↑

81. Mental Health Complaints Commissioner (Vic), The Right to Be Safe: Ensuring Sexual Safety in Acute Mental Health Inpatient Units: Responses from Services to Project Recommendations (Report, May 2020) 5–16 <https://www.mhcc.vic.gov.au/mental-health-service-responses-our-sexual-safety-report>.

    ↑

82. Ibid 4.

    ↑

83. Consultation 66 (Consultation focused on people who have a lived experience of states of mental and emotional distress commonly labelled as ‘mental health challenges’).

    ↑

84. Royal Commission into Victoria’s Mental Health System (Final Report, 3 February 2021) Recommendations 13, 52. See also Recommendation 44 <https://finalreport.rcvmhs.vic.gov.au/>.

    ↑

85. For a general discussion of aged care, see Rebecca Storen, Aged Care: A Quick Guide (Report, Parliamentary Library, 30 April 2021) <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22library%2Fprspub%2F7933570%22>.

    ↑

86. See Submission 1 (Dr Catherine Barrett).

    ↑

87. Australian Law Reform Commission, Elder Abuse—A National Legal Response (Report No 131, 2017) Recommendation 4–1 <https://www.alrc.gov.au/publication/elder-abuse-a-national-legal-response-alrc-report-131/>; ‘Serious Incident Response Scheme’, Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission (Web Page, 23 July 2021) <https://www.agedcarequality.gov.au/sirs>. See also Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety (Final Report, 1 March 2021) Recommendation 100 <https://agedcare.royalcommission.gov.au/publications/final-report>; Kate Carnell and Ron Paterson, Review of National Aged Care Quality Regulatory Processes (Report, October 2017) Recommendation 6 <https://www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/review-of-national-aged-care-quality-regulatory-processes-report>.

    ↑

88. Previously, there was a discretion not to report where the alleged assault was committed by a resident with an assessed cognitive or mental impairment: see Rosemary Mann et al, Norma’s Project—A Research Study into the Sexual Assault of Older Women in Australia (Report, Australian Research Centre in Sex, Health and Society, La Trobe University, 30 June 2014) 48 <https://apo.org.au/node/40334>.

    ↑

89. Australian Association of Gerontology Workshop and Policy Recommendations, A Fair Future for Older Women Who Experience Sexual Abuse: What Needs to Be Done (Report, 2019) 16 <https://www.aag.asn.au/news-publications/policy-papers/a-fair-future-for-older-women-who-experience-sexual-abuse>. See also Aged Care Quality and Safety Commission, Serious Incident Response Scheme – Guidelines for Residential Aged Care Providers (Guidelines, 17 June 2021) <https://www.agedcarequality.gov.au/resources/serious-incident-response-scheme-guidelines-residential-aged-care-providers>.

    ↑

90. Ibid.

    ↑

91. Submission 3 (Health Law and Ageing Research Unit, Monash University).

    ↑

92. Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality and Safety (Final Report, 1 March 2021) <https://agedcare.royalcommission.gov.au/publications/final-report>.

    ↑

93. See Submission 1 (Dr Catherine Barrett); Alison Branley and Loretta Lohberger, ‘Aged Care Royal Commission Hears There Are around 50 Sexual Assaults a Week of Residents Nationally’, ABC News (online, 22 October 2020) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-22/aged-care-royal-comm-told-of-50-sex-assaults-a-week/12801806>.

    ↑

94. See, eg, the Child Safe Standards, reporting within institutions, and diverse contexts (eg, out-of-home care): Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse: Final Report (Report, December 2017) chs 6, 7, 12–16 <https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/final-report>.

    ↑

95. Submission 20 (Anonymous member of the Aboriginal community).

    ↑

96. Submission 17 (Sexual Assault Services Victoria).

    ↑

97. For a model, see National SART Guidelines Development Group (Ireland), National Guidelines on Referral and Forensic Clinical Examination Following Rape and Sexual Assault (Ireland) (Guidelines, 4th ed, Sexual Assault Response Team, 2018) <https://www.hse.ie/eng/services/publications/healthprotection/sexual-assault-response-team-national-guidelines.pdf>.

    ↑

98. Consultation 63 (A victim survivor of sexual assault, name withheld).

    ↑

99. Submission 17 (Sexual Assault Services Victoria).

    ↑

100. Ibid.

     ↑

101. Sally F Kelty et al, ‘Dismantling the Justice Silos: Flowcharting the Role and Expertise of Forensic Science, Forensic Medicine and Allied Health in Adult Sexual Assault Investigations’ (2018) 285 Forensic Science International 21, 21–2; Sally F Kelty, Roberta Julian and Alastair Ross, ‘Dismantling the Justice Silos: Avoiding the Pitfalls and Reaping the Benefits of Information-Sharing between Forensic Science, Medicine and Law’ (2013) 230(1–3) Forensic Science International 8.

     ↑

102. Submission 11 (Associate Professor John AM Gall).

     ↑

103. Submission 68 (Victoria Police). See also Centre for Innovative Justice (RMIT), Communicating with Victims about Resolution Decisions: A Study of Victims’ Experiences and Communication Needs (Report to the Office of Public Prosecutions (Vic), April 2019) <https://cij.org.au/cms/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/communicating-with-victims-about-resolution-decisions–a-study-of-victims-experiences-and-communication-needs-1.pdf>. For related reforms, see, eg, Victorian Government, ‘Client Partnership Strategy for The Orange Door’, VIC.GOV.AU (Web Page, 27 November 2019) <https://www.vic.gov.au/client-partnership-strategy-orange-door>; Department of Health and Human Services (Vic), ‘Client Voice Framework for Community Services’, DHHS.vic (Web Page, 14 November 2019) <https://www.dhhs.vic.gov.au/publications/client-voice-framework-community-services>.

     ↑

104. Consultation 22 (First roundtable on the experience of LGBTIQA+ people).

     ↑

105. Victoria Police, Code of Practice for the Investigation of Sexual Crime (Policy, 2016) <https://content.police.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-01/Code-of-Practice-for-the-Investigation-of-Sexual-Crime-%282016%29.pdf>.

     ↑

106. Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, Sexual Assault Response Teams (SART): A Model Protocol for Virginia (Report, May 2011) 6–7 <https://www.communitysolutionsva.org//index.php/resources/item/sexual-assault-response-teams-sart-a-model-protocol-for-virginia>.

     ↑

107. Megan R Greeson and Rebecca Campbell, ‘Coordinated Community Efforts to Respond to Sexual Assault: A National Study of Sexual Assault Response Team Implementation’ (2015) 30(14) Journal of Interpersonal Violence 2470, 2471–2, 2482–3.

     ↑

108. Megan R Greeson and Rebecca Campbell, ‘Sexual Assault Response Teams (SARTs): An Empirical Review of Their Effectiveness and Challenges to Successful Implementation’ (2013) 14(2) Trauma, Violence, & Abuse 83, 92. The response of the legal, medical, and mental health/advocacy systems to sexual assault has been inadequate and uncoordinated. To address this problem, communities have developed coordinated sexual assault response teams (SARTs).

     ↑

109. Ibid 93.

     ↑

110. Megan R Greeson et al, ‘Improving the Community Response to Sexual Assault: An Empirical Examination of the Effectiveness of Sexual Assault Response Teams (SARTs)’ (2016) 6(2) Psychology of Violence 280, 288–90.

     ↑

111. National Sexual Violence Resource Center, ‘Section 3.1 Build Your SART’, Sexual Assault Response Team Toolkit (Online Manual) <https://www.nsvrc.org/sarts/toolkit/3-1>.

     ↑

112. ‘Protocols and Guidelines for Sexual Assault Response Teams’, NSVRC National Sexual Violence Resource Center (Web Page) <https://www.nsvrc.org/sarts/protocols-and-guidelines>.

     ↑

113. For a protocol that provides key considerations: see Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, Sexual Assault Response Teams (SART): A Model Protocol for Virginia (Report, May 2011) <https://www.communitysolutionsva.org//index.php/resources/item/sexual-assault-response-teams-sart-a-model-protocol-for-virginia>. For a protocol that sets out a model template: see Office of the Child Advocate for the Protection of Children, State of Georgia, 2017 Statewide Model Protocol: Multidisciplinary Investigation & Prosecution of Child Abuse, Sexual Abuse & Sexual Exploitation (Protocol, 7 November 2017) <https://oca.georgia.gov/sites/oca.georgia.gov/files/related_files/document/2017-18%20Statewide%20Model%20Protocol%20FINAL.pdf>.

     ↑

114. Georgia Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, Georgia Sexual Assault Response Team Guide (Report, 2021) 42 https://svrga.org/resources/sexual-assault-response-team-sart-guide.

     ↑

115. Office of the Child Advocate for the Protection of Children, State of Georgia, 2017 Statewide Model Protocol: Multidisciplinary Investigation & Prosecution of Child Abuse, Sexual Abuse & Sexual Exploitation (Protocol, 7 November 2017) 6 <https://oca.georgia.gov/sites/oca.georgia.gov/files/related_files/document/2017-18%20Statewide%20Model%20Protocol%20FINAL.pdf>.

     ↑

116. See the interim service interfaces in Victorian Government, ‘Practitioner Resources for The Orange Door’, VIC.GOV.AU (Web Page, 30 April 2021) <http://www.vic.gov.au/orange-door-practitioner-resources>.

     ↑

117. Victorian Government, Interim Operational Guidance between The Orange Door and Victoria Police (Report, October 2018) 10–11, 16–17 <https://www.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-05/Interface-between-The-Orange-Door-and-Victoria-Police.pdf>.

     ↑

118. Queensland Government, Response to Sexual Assault: Queensland Government Interagency Guidelines for Responding to People Who Have Experienced Sexual Assault (Report, June 2014) <https://www.publications.qld.gov.au/dataset/1f7ea4ec-bec8-4428-ab60-0a6c119ac70d/resource/3b3958c9-504f-4698-a64d-e56ca7e5248e/download/qld-govt-guidelines-for-responding-to-sexual-assualt.pdf>.

     ↑

119. Association of Chief Police Officers (UK) and Crown Prosecution Service (UK), Protocol between the Police Service and Crown Prosecution Service in the Investigation and Prosecution of Rape (Protocol, 2015) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/acpo-cps-protocol-investigation-and-prosecution-allegations-rape-january-2015>.

     ↑

120. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (UK) and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of the Crown Prosecution Service (UK), Forging the Links: Rape Investigation and Prosecution (Report, February 2012) [4.2]–[4.6] <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/media/forging-the-links-rape-investigation-and-prosecution-20120228.pdf>.

     ↑

121. This will be updated as a result of a recently announced Joint National Action Plan: Crown Prosecution Service (UK), ‘Police-CPS Joint National RASSO (Rape and Serious Sexual Offences) Action Plan 2021’, CPS (Web Page, 22 January 2021) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/police-cps-joint-national-rasso-rape-and-serious-sexual-offences-action-plan-2021>.

     ↑

122. Association of Chief Police Officers (UK) and Crown Prosecution Service (UK), Protocol between the Police Service and Crown Prosecution Service in the Investigation and Prosecution of Rape (Protocol, 2015) Section 15 <https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/acpo-cps-protocol-investigation-and-prosecution-allegations-rape-january-2015>.

     ↑

123. Ibid Section 17.

     ↑

124. See, eg, New South Wales Ombudsman, The JIRT Partnership—20 Years On (Report, 5 October 2018) ch 25 <https://www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/news-and-publications/publications/reports/child-protection/the-jirt-partnership-20-years-on>.

     ↑

125. Victims’ Charter Act 2006 (Vic) s 1.

     ↑

126. These include those who provide services to victims of crime either under law or through public funding, and public officials responsible for providing such services: ibid s 3.

     ↑

127. This is adapted from the Department of Justice and Community Safety, ‘The Victims’ Charter’, Victims of Crime Commissioner, (Web Page, 31 May 2021) <https://www.victimsofcrimecommissioner.vic.gov.au/complaints/the-victims-charter>.

     ↑

128. See, eg, Victims of Crime Commissioner Act 2015 (Vic) div 3A. This role has recently been strengthened following recommendations in our 2016 inquiry into the role of victims of crime at trial: Victims and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2018 (Vic); Victorian Law Reform Commission, The Role of Victims of Crime in the Criminal Trial Process (Report No 34, August 2016).

     ↑

129. Department of Justice and Community Safety (Vic), ‘What We Do’, Victims of Crime Commissioner (Web Page, 22 July 2021) <https://www.victimsofcrimecommissioner.vic.gov.au/about/what-we-do>; Victims of Crime Commissioner Act 2015 (Vic) s 13.

     ↑

130. Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2014 (Scotland) ss 8, 9, although s 9 has not yet come into force.

     ↑

131. Ministry of Justice (UK), Code of Practice for Victims of Crime in England and Wales (Code of Practice, November 2020) <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/974376/victims-code-2020.pdf>.

     ↑

132. This reflects existing provisions set out in the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) pt 8.2 divs 4–6, as well as the new right recommended in that chapter.

     ↑

133. This reflects existing provisions in the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic) s 32D and the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 344, as well as changes to those provisions referred to in Chapter 21.

     ↑

134. Victims of Crime Commissioner Act 2015 (Vic) s 25.

     ↑

135. Department of Justice and Community Safety (Vic), ‘Victim Participation in the Justice System’, Victims of Crime Commissioner (Web Page, 23 June 2021) <https://www.victimsofcrimecommissioner.vic.gov.au/about/media/victim-participation-in-the-justice-system>.

     ↑

136. See also Tyrone Kirchengast, Mary Iliadis and Michael O’Connell, ‘Development of the Office of Commissioner of Victims’ Rights as an Appropriate Response to Improving the Experiences of Victims in the Criminal Justice System: Integrity, Access and Justice for Victims of Crime’ (2019) 45(1) Monash University Law Review 1.

     ↑

137. Daniel Andrews (Premier of Victoria), ‘Top Advocate Appointed As Victims Of Crime Commissioner’ (Media Release, 13 June 2019) <http://www.premier.vic.gov.au/top-advocate-appointed-victims-crime-commissioner>.

     ↑

138. Family Violence Reform Implementation Monitor Act 2016 (Vic) ss 5, 14, 23, 24.

     ↑

139. Consultation 8 (Family Violence Reform Implementation Monitor).

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